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The Changing Nature of War and the Permissibility of 
Preventive Military Action 
 
 
“But there assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, 
without having been ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack; and it is very important 
that nations should make up their minds in time, as to what these cases are” 
         
John Stuart Mill 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper I argue that the Just War Theory in its current state is anachronistic and requires 
modernising. I set out how the domain of war has changed over time, specifically with new 
threats from weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors. These changes require a 
modernisation of the theory, and a product of this modernisation is developing a preventive 
war doctrine generally seen to be impermissible, as permissible. I make the case based on the 
changing nature of threats, and, extend the notion of self-defence to include preventive action. 
I highlight the epistemic problem in today’s war environment regarding the ‘last resort’ 
condition of the Just War Theory, and argue that if pre-emptive attacks are permissible, then 
based on the same epistemic logic, preventive wars are also permissible.   
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
To borrow a saying attributed to John Maynard Keynes by Paul Samuelson, “when my 
information changes, I alter my conclusions, what do you do sir?1”. Social scientists chart the 
ever-developing societal changes of humankind by recognising inventions that changed 
industry, individuals who changed society, and events that changed our trajectory. A category 
of event that appears regretfully too often is that of war, and like all things under the 
dominion of time, it changes too. The acts of war change, the scope of war changes, and 
likewise, so does the constitution of war. Technological advances, the nature of international 
politics, and the insatiable quest for power amongst some people, are just three of a plethora 
of reasons one could choose to exemplify why campaigns have led to such a vast number of 
lives lost across the history of our species.  
 
                                                      
1 John Maynard Keynes, in response to a criticism during the Great Depression of having a changing view on 
monetary policy, quoted in "The Keynes Centenary" by Paul Samuelson, in The Economist Vol. 287 (1983), p.19 	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Rightfully, war is recognised as a morally demanding event. Is a certain war justified? Can a 
war ever be justified? On what grounds can a collection of events warrant accepting huge loss 
of life in some cases but not others? Such questions demand serious consideration, for war is 
prevalent and must be attended to with the moral significance it deserves. That war has 
fostered significant moral application throughout history is evinced by the historical 
development of the Just War Theory that serves to provide conditions, which, upon 
satisfaction present a special circumstance in which a war may be morally justified. 
Development in the nature of war thus requires such conditions to keep pace if they are to 
remain relevant in contemporary moral theory regarding war, and thus the need to examine 
the conditions is apparent.  
 
This essay attempts such a task by demonstrating some of the aspects in which the 
environment of war has changed, and built upon this, why the conventional Just War Theory 
should be modernised. Furthermore, it examines the conventional distinction between pre-
emptive attacks and preventive war, which claims that the former can be justified while the 
latter can’t. I suggest that such a distinction is no longer useful in light of the modern war 
environment and that a preventive doctrine of war could be justified. To keep the focus 
narrow and clear, I do not make explicit legal analysis of the international statutes, nor do I 
provide legalistic solutions to the problems that present themselves. I also do not approach 
questions regarding the ontology of war in terms of whether terrorism and non-state actors 
can be incorporated into Just War Theory. My position incorporates quasi-belligerent action, 
such as the violence of terrorism, into the moral principles that guide such a theory and thus 
whether a “war on terror” is ontologically a war will not be explored. Rather, I focus on the 
moral aspects of war that serve to guide legal theorists in legislating normative judgements. 
Furthermore, I do not explore the normative role that the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)”2 
commitment makes, agreed at the 2005 UN World Summit, nor do I make a case for 
humanitarian intervention regarding sanctions or military action. The focus is strictly on 
modernising the Just War Theory in order to stay relevant, with a product of this being the 
collapse of the distinction between pre-emptive attacks and preventive wars.  
 
First, I outline the traditional conception of Just War Theory and highlight the six conditions 
that need satisfying. I continue by presenting the changing situation that the environment of 
war finds itself in by making reference to technological developments, such as weapons of 
mass destruction, and the rise of non-state actors changing the traditional dynamic of war. In 
                                                      2	  For further reading regarding R2P, refer to Kantareva, Silva D. (2011) The Responsibility to Protect: Issues of a 
legal formulation and practical application. Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Law (New York: CASIN) 6, 1, pp. 
1-26. & Nardin, T (2013) From Right to Intervene to Duty to Protect: Michael Walzer on Humanitarian 
Intervention. The European Journal of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 24, 1, pp. 67-82 
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section three I outline the conventional distinction between pre-emptive attacks and 
preventive war, and construct a consequentialist approach to self-defence in an attempt to 
merge the distinction, and further, make the case that with the collapse of this dichotomy, 
preventive war can be deemed justifiable by calling it a defensive act.  The final section 
displays the typical objection to preventive war, which argues that such a doctrine would lead 
to an environment of war of all against all. I reject this criticism, making reference to 
institutional conditions that could be demanded in order to try and keep peace, and further, 
present a case that in the modern environment, the epistemic demands of pre-emptive and 
preventive doctrines are broadly analogous, and as such should rise and fall together when 
critiqued.   
 
2) The Just War Theory and the Changing Face of War 
 
i) The conditions of Just War Theory 
 
As outlined above, this thesis makes the case for a reformulated just war theory, in order to 
keep pace with the changing scope and setting of war. As things stand the criteria are 
anachronistic. Rendered inflexible by traditional restrictions and incongruent with modernity, 
the theory demands modification to be understood in the contemporary world. Prior to 
offering suggestions for a reformed theory however, it is necessary to outline and explore the 
current theory’s conditions, and the limitations of them. What follows in this section then, is 
an overview of the requirements the theory currently demands in order to clarify the 
justification and permissibility of a war. 
 
The Just War Theory as a doctrine originates from Christian theology, notably Saint 
Augustine, who drew on ideas put forward by classical writers from Greece and Rome 
(Rawls, 1999, 103). This was adopted almost a millennium later by Thomas Aquinas who set 
out conditions under which a war could be considered just, and was developed thereafter most 
notably from Cajetan (1468-1543), Vitoria (ca.1492–1546), Suárez (1548-1617), and Grotius 
(1583-1645) (Reichberg, 2008, 12). The context in which the doctrine was developed is 
therefore heavily influenced through Christian theology, and as such it should be recognised 
that for Aquinas at least, the Crusades – and the justification of them – weighed heavily in the 
doctrine’s formulation. The moral obstacles that war presents continue today however, and 
the dilemmas surrounding decisions of war persist. Contemporary thinkers are the focus of 
this paper, and I draw heavily on the thoughts of David Rodin (2007), David Luban (2007), 
Henry Shue (2007) and Michael Walzer (2006), amongst others.  
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From the outset, traditional Just War Theory is sub-categorized into two parts; jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello. The traditional ad bellum/in bello distinction separates what constitutes a just 
decision in going to war (ad bellum), and justified action of a warring party in the process of 
war (in bello). Since preventive war is contentious as a justification for initiating a war, it is 
the ad bellum conditions that will be my focus. 
 
There are six general conditions of jus ad bellum, of which all must be satisfied in order to 
constitute a justified act of war. I here paraphrase Nathanson, and the principles are as follows 
(Nathanson, 2013, 148):  
 
1) Just Cause: this condition demands that the reason for which a war is initiated is 
morally significant. It cannot be a capricious decision, but grounded in a legitimate 
moral reason. Territorial advantage or economic gain would not constitute such a 
reason for example, and defence against aggressive actions is widely accepted as 
the standard just cause.  
 
2) Legitimate Authority: it is required that the declaration of war is made by a 
legitimate authority. Such an authority tends to be a government, or in some cases 
non-governmental groups like NATO may count. Excluded from this condition are 
private groups or organisations.  
 
3) Right Intention: bound to the notion of a just cause is the idea that such a cause 
should be carried out with the right intention. For instance, declaring that a war is 
being fought to safeguard the rights of an oppressed citizenry - which could 
constitute a just cause – but fighting with the intention to secure territorial or 
economic gain would fail this required standard.  
 
4) Probability of Success: this condition discourages, and renders unjustified the act 
of going to war in cases where success seems slim. While going to war in the face 
of probable defeat could be laudable in thought, it anticipates the inevitable 
destruction of a social fabric and the tragic loss of life, and as such prudence 
defeats nobility. If probable success isn’t a strongly held conviction, going to war 
is not just.  
 
5) Proportionality: much like the previous condition, in anticipation of the inevitable 
negative effects that a campaign of war entails, proportional means must be used 
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to justify initiating conflict. In addition, the positive effects of the war should 
outweigh the negative.  
 
6) Last Resort: this condition mandates that if there is anything else that can be done 
other than initiating war, then these should be exhausted prior to such an initiation. 
Diplomacy, sanctions, and various other methods are postulated as alternative 
actions to declaring war.  
 
Taken collectively, these 6 principles outline the conditions necessary for a justified call to 
arms, and formulate the permissive nature of an attack. They “reflect a morally serious 
attitude toward war” (Nathanson, 2013, 148) and as Stephen Nathanson further 
acknowledges, “[w]hile they accept the possibility of justified wars, they show a strong 
aversion to war and do not treat it as an ordinary policy option” (Nathanson, 2013, 148).  
 
Nathanson’s assertion that the need for a Just War Theory indicates war is generally 
undesirable may be an obvious point to make, but the implications of such a statement bring 
to the fore why having a modernised theory is of such importance. If these conditions, when 
satisfied, bring us to a state of affairs which require a significant and serious application of 
war, then it is absolutely essential that the conditions in need of satisfying are congruent with 
the context in which they are placed. By this I mean that if we cannot bring sensible 
application of the conditions to a current state of affairs, then the conditions need to be altered 
if we are to continue using such a framework.  
 
It is with regard to the final condition of “last resort” that I propose is most in need of 
modernising, in order to enable fair application of a just war theory for warfare - specifically 
preventive warfare - in today’s state of affairs. My focus on the “last resort” condition is two-
fold. First, there are epistemic problems with adjudicating when the “last resort” really is in a 
world littered with weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism. Secondly, the 
conventional distinction between a pre-emptive attack, generally acknowledged as 
permissible, and preventive war, generally acknowledged as impermissible, is contingent on 
temporal distance. The “last resort” is a temporal condition, and thus much can be gleaned 
from such a distinction when considering how to ascertain if a situation really is a “last 
resort”. This will be explored in detail in section three but briefly put here, I make the case 
that preventive war and pre-emptive attack have broadly analogous logic when considered in 
light of the modern state of war. My argument’s logic is that if “last resort” can be used as 
justification for pre-emptive war in the conventional application of the just war theory, then in 
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a theory that is brought into the 21st century, such a justification extends to the concept of 
preventive war too. 
 
ii) The Modern State of War  
 
As I proposed above, the environment of international politics finds itself in a new position.  
There are two clear ways that the sphere of international warfare has changed over recent 
years. These are technological advances and the growing influence of terrorist organisations. 
Weapons of mass destruction have changed the way in which responses to threats must be 
levied and present an immense danger to human life through destruction of infrastructure, 
buildings, and ecology, and this presents a new threat requiring new responses. Together with 
this development in technology is the rise of non-state actors. Terrorist groups present an 
increasing problem that blur the classical idea of sovereignty, war, and present new 
techniques that must be dealt with. “The new phenomenon of the suicide bomber, who 
marries distorted religious conviction to nihilism, and low-technology weaponry to produce 
lethal personal effects and critical political effects is the obvious example of this” (Weigel, 
2007, 22). Hardly a day passes without acts – inspired by religious extremism – that cause 
mass casualties in the Middle East, Africa, and more sporadically in Europe and Asia. 
Naturally, forming effective responses to this relatively nascent threat is crucial.  
 
Coupled with the military technological advancements previously mentioned, the globalised 
world also provides a framework within which such threats can grow and prosper. “Western 
nations have knitted together a smooth system for the transportation of goods, people and 
capital that makes it easy to move money instantaneously between nations” argues John Yoo3, 
“[b]ut this same network makes possible unsophisticated delivery systems for WMDs” (Yoo, 
2014, 87). Thus a double-edged sword emerges. There is great benefit in ‘localising’ the 
world: it benefits trade, increases standards of living, and presents third world countries with 
an opportunity to drag themselves up the development scale. But while such benefits can be 
recognised and celebrated, the jeopardy of such a system must be observed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      3	  It is recognised that John Yoo is a controversial figure within the topic of preventive war. He served as Deputy 
Assistant U.S Attorney General for the George W. Bush administration, and authored many legal documents, 
including the now infamous ‘Torture Memos’ that made the legal case for enhanced interrogation techniques, 
including water-boarding. As such, much consideration has been given to the use of citations from him. See e.g. 
Sands, Phillipe (2008) Torture Team. London: Penguin	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Marc Trachtenberg acknowledges that:  
 
“[o]n September 11th, 2001, the United States suddenly found itself in what seemed to be a new world, 
a perplexing world, a world where the old guideposts no longer seemed adequate. How was the nation 
to deal with the enormous problems it now faced? Above all, what could it do to make sure that 
horrifying weapons – atomic weapons and biological weapons – would not be used against it?” 
(Trachtenberg, 2007, 40). 
 
The attacks of September 11th truly shook the world. In both terms of magnitude of deaths, 
and the extent of organisation, the Bush administration was forced to respond to the 
catastrophic terrorism in a new way. As such, the conventional system of war had shifted, and 
this shift was demonstrated in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), 
which recognised the threat posed by global terrorism:  
 
“[A]s a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best…Legal 
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an 
imminent threat – most often a visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries”4 
 
Captured in this statement is a notion that strikes directly at the heart of the requirement for a 
reformed Just War Theory. The concept of what an imminent threat is has changed due to the 
capacities that weapons of mass destruction have. In the event that a rogue state, or a terrorist 
organisation, should come into possession of such a weapon, the notion of how a threat can be 
imminent fundamentally changes. With the launch of a long-range missile of mass destructive 
capability, there might not be a visible mobilisation of armies on borders. What’s more, the 
sporadic nature of pervasive ideology, such as that of Islamic fundamentalism, means that 
there are potential threats throughout the world and as such the Just War Theory in its 
traditional sense is insufficient to deal with these threats.  
 
It is therefore required to develop a theory that keeps pace with the evolving nature of war. In 
the next section I will outline the traditional distinction made between pre-emptive and 
preventive war. It relies on two proposed morally significant factors; imminence and claims 
of self-defence. I argue that the contemporary state of affairs has broadly collapsed such a 
                                                      4	  The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, pp. 4-19, at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (accessed 9 May 2016) 
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distinction and that preventive war can be waged in self-defence because of the potential 
imminence involved when dealing with non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction.  
 
3) Pre-emption, prevention, and defensive attacks 
 
i) Pre-emptive attack and preventive war: what is the difference?   
 
When the bombs have stopped falling, and arms lain down in conflict, how to judge the 
genesis of a particular war is a pressing question. “Who started the shooting [and] who sent 
troops across the border?” asks Michael Walzer in starting the fifth chapter of his significant 
work Just and Unjust Wars. “These are questions of fact” he reiterates, “not of judgement” 
(Walzer, 2006, 74). Questions of fact they may be, but the simplicity of observing who fired 
the first shot is independent of determining the process that brought about such a state of 
affairs. This is not to say Walzer makes such a connection; indeed he makes quite the 
opposite point, recognising that in an environment as nuanced as war, each individual 
situation demands a contextual approach as “aggression often begins without shots being fired 
or borders being crossed” (Walzer, 2006, 74).   
 
It must be noted that there are difficulties, both philosophically and practically, in judging 
what is to be the first aggressive action. There is a continuing debate within the branch of 
epistemology between distinguishing what counts as a motive and what counts as an intention 
and thus a philosophical problem arises in ascribing to an agent the notion that they intended, 
or were motivated to do something5. This problem presents itself in the practical sense of how 
are we to know when some event is cloaked with aggressive intentions. Some, for example, 
can see the development of uranium as an intention of aggression, but to others it could 
simply be an innocent development of nuclear energy. This is seen most clearly in 
contemporary politics regarding Iran’s nuclear development program. Proof criteria are thus 
required in the complete application of a preventive war doctrine that I propose, but to keep 
the focus on the conceptual idea of a preventive doctrine, this will not be explored. There are 
certain institutional reforms however, that could be made to provide general criteria of proof 
                                                      
5 For further discussion of this philosophical problem, refer to Davidson, D., (1963), ‘Actions, Reasons, and 
Causes,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 3–20., McDowell, 
J., (2010), ‘What is the Content of an Intention in Action?’ Ratio, 23: 415–432, Shah, N., (2009), ‘How Action 
Governs Intention,’ Philosophers' Imprint, 8: 1–19. 
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and accountability in accusing some agent of making a first aggressive act. A framework 
similar to that suggested by Keohane and Buchanan in Section Three for example, could be 
used.  
 
A division within war theory regarding two types of military action demonstrates the 
contextual importance that Walzer is emphasising in the quote at the beginning of this 
section.  Pre-emptive attacks and preventive wars are a contested area, with the former 
generally being deemed permissible and the latter impermissible. How to distinguish between 
the two has been a matter of much debate (Strachan, 2007; Ugilt, 2012; Dershowitz, 2006), 
but a widely accepted way to make such a distinction is that an attack can be regarded as pre-
emptive only when it is in response to a threat which is imminent. This is seen as justified due 
to the notion of self-defence. The implicit consequence of this is such that preventive war is 
in response to a perceived threat that is not imminent, and thus any military action wouldn’t 
constitute self-defence, and is therefore unjustified (Luban 2007, 171; Uniacke, 2007, 80).   
 
On the surface, the distinction is simply temporal; pre-emptive attacks are self-defensive 
actions as a way to avert an imminent harm, whilst a preventive war looks further into the 
future to strike a threat before it becomes imminent. Emphasising the inherently speculative 
nature of preventive force, it is described by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane as “the 
initiation of military action in anticipation of harmful actions that are neither presently 
occurring nor imminent” (Buchanan & Keohane, 2004, 1). Thus the morally significant and 
decisive factor in determining whether action is pre-emptive and thus permissible, or whether 
it is preventive and impermissible, is the imminence of the threat. It is essentially a difference 
of degree. “Whether a war is preventive or pre-emptive will depend on how well developed a 
threat is when the war is waged” remarks Helen Frowe. “Halting a threat in the early stages of 
development will be preventive war; halting a threat in the final stages of development will be 
pre-emptive war” (Frowe, 2011, 73). 
 
Of course, this begs the question of formulating a working definition of imminence and while 
a degree of vagueness is prone to go hand in hand with the use of imprecise words, there are 
certain formulations which various theorists have proposed. A regularly cited case is the 
Caroline incident (Crawford, 2007, 119; Rodin, 2007, 163; Luban, 2007, 171; Walzer, 2006, 
74). In 1837 Canadians rebelling against the foreign rule of Britain took refuge on Navy 
Island after the failed Upper Canada Rebellion and were supported by sympathetic Americans 
with provisions using a steamboat, Caroline, on the Niagara River. The British destroyed the 
boat, and made the case that they acted in pre-emptive self-defence. Daniel Webster, who at 
the time was US Secretary of State, dismissed such arguments maintaining that such acts of 
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self-defence required the situation to be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation”6. For Webster at least, imminence required a very narrow 
scope in which there really was no viable alternative action that could be taken. It seems that 
by Webster’s definition one could only act pre-emptively in conditions tantamount to 
coercion. The choice to act or not is no longer there; act now or suffer the consequences.   
 
Webster’s formulation, while an oft-cited case, has been recognised to be too restrictive by 
some theorists. Michael Walzer offers an alternative theory by which he wants to loosen the 
reins on what constitutes pre-emptive war. He remarks that the Websterian view would 
“permit us to do little more than respond to an attack once we had seen it coming but before 
we had felt its impact” (Walzer, 2006, 74). Instead, Walzer asks us to imagine a “spectrum of 
anticipation”, which “at one end is Webster’s reflex, necessary and determined; at the other 
end is preventive war, an attack that responds to a distant danger, a matter of foresight and 
free choice” (Walzer, 2006, 75). He proposes a sliding scale that one can slowly shuffle along 
to the point where we find a dividing line between attacks which are defensive and 
permissible, and those which are not. While imminence is still the distinction grounding the 
dichotomy, it does not require that there is “no moment for deliberation”, as if it did, he 
would not have felt necessary to put Webster’s definition at the end of the spectrum. Rather, 
Walzer feels it is at a time that “is still possible to make choices, to begin the fighting or arm 
oneself and wait” (Walzer, 2006, 75).  
 
This of course leaves the possibility that there are threats which are imminent, but leave time 
for deliberation on action. This looks like a case for preventive war, but acknowledging such 
a logic applies to both pre-emptive attacks and preventive war, Walzer separates the two by 
attributing pre-emptive attacks the characteristic of being a defensive act, while preventive 
war is “fought to maintain the balance, to stop what is thought to be an even distribution of 
power from shifting into a relation of dominance and inferiority” (Walzer, 2006, 76). To be 
clear, Walzer subscribes to the view that under his sliding scale formulation, pre-emptive war 
is justified and preventive war is not, and it is grounded in the act being an act of self-defence.  
 
The basic formulation of such an argument is this: a sensible way to discern if an attack is 
unjustified is if the use of force is against an agent that hasn’t itself used force. At first glance 
this seems to suggest that a pre-emptive attack would be unjustified; after all, it is striking an 
enemy before having been struck. But the proponent of pre-emption, such as Walzer, says 
                                                      6	  A letter dated 24 April 1841, from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton. The letter is available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (accessed 6 May 2016).	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“no”, it is a defensive use of force and thus justified, in spite of it being the initial forceful 
action. As Henry Shue and David Rodin note in the introduction of their book Pre-emption:  
 
“[p]re-emption looks suspicious because it is the first use of force, and because the first use of force is 
usually aggression, or anyhow some form of unjustified attack. But pre-emption can be a justified 
attack because it is a defensive attack, however paradoxical this may sound; and it is a defensive attack 
because, far from initiating the conflict, it is a response to an impending unjustified attack” (Shue & 
Rodin, 2007, 2). 
 
It is then the task of the remainder of this section to explore the conventional way of 
distinguishing between when the ‘first use of aggression’ can count as a defensive attack and 
when it doesn’t, and further, if this distinction is a suitable way of discerning between pre-
emptive and preventive action. At this point I borrow some terminology from Henry Shue, 
who in asking what a justified preventive military attack would look like, sets out to navigate 
around the defensive action debate: “So that we have a designation that does not already carry 
any moral baggage, let us call a military action that is neither a defensive response against an 
actual attack nor a pre-emption of an imminent threat an ‘early military attack’” (Shue, 2007, 
222).  
 
So as we proceed from here we have the two categories of distinction generally outlined. 
There are pre-emptive attacks that are justified by virtue of being a defensive response to an 
imminent threat, and preventive wars, which are unjustified early military attacks with the 
intention to prevent a potential threat becoming an actual threat. I will adopt Shue’s 
terminology of ‘early military attacks’ initially for the sake of clarity, but I argue in favour of 
a position that encourages admitting preventive war into the category of a defensive attack.  
 
ii) A defensive attack in the modern age 
 
Acting in pre-emptive defence is a justifiable ground on which to engage in military action 
under just war theory. Indeed, just war theory counts only two situations to be a ‘just cause’ 
for war; self-defence and humanitarian intervention. Thus in measuring whether a military 
action is justifiable, we must have a clear and precise understanding of what acting in self-
defence entails. The traditional conception of self-defence is out-dated, and I argue that in 
today’s war environment, “early military attacks” can justifiably be waged as an act of self-
defence. If preventive war can be shown to be acting in self-defence, it will go someway to 
expressing its permissibility. 
 
PPE MA Thesis 
Supervisor: Glen Newey  Alex Russell (s1735098) 
 
 12 
Alberico Gentili, a sixteenth century Italian jurist regarded as one of the founders of 
international law and quoted by Neta Crawford in Pre-emption, stated:  
 
“[n]o one ought to expose himself to danger. No one ought to wait to be struck, unless he is a fool. One 
ought to provide not only against an offence which is being committed, but also against one which may 
possibly be committed. Force must be repelled and kept aloof by force. Therefore one should not wait 
for it to come; for in this waiting there are the undoubted disadvantages” (Crawford, 2007, 116, 
emphasis my own) 
 
For Gentili then, acting prior to being attacked was seemingly common sense self-defence, 
grounded in expediency, even in such cases that may only be a potential harm. It is the notion 
of there being a significant moral difference between an actual threat of harm, and a potential 
threat of harm becoming actual, or a potential emerging threat, that is the cause of 
consternation regarding acts of self-defence.  
  
Accompanying a criterion of imminence of an actual threat, the right of self-defence usually 
requires the satisfaction of two other criteria; necessity and proportionality (Rodin, 2007, 
160). Self-defence under this view suggests the permissibility to placate the feeling of fear 
one may feel when faced with a threat, and a justified response is with force. David Rodin 
suggests that such a position of practical necessity is “quite incompatible with the idea of 
preventive war. For on this view it is precisely the imminence of the potentially fatal attack 
and the extreme psychological pressure this imposes that makes defensive acts excusable” 
(Rodin, 2007, 163). Rodin’s suggestion is thus that “early military attacks” cannot be 
described as self-defence because the nature of the threat is such, that its lack of imminence 
precludes a feeling of necessary action on the attacker’s behalf. I contend however, that the 
state of affairs we find in today’s international environment allows for early military attacks 
to be a result of necessity and therefore fall under the justification of self-defence.  
 
If self-defence is considered applicable only when there is a necessity to attack, and if this 
necessity is a product only of the imminence (in the conventional sense) of the threat, then it 
is ignoring the reality of a modern war environment. John Yoo highlights this when 
expressing that “under current international rules, best expressed by the Caroline affair, a 
nation has the same limited right to stop a potential temporary border incursion as it does to 
stop a possible WMD attack” (Yoo, 2014, 84). This seemingly disproportional congruence is 
evinced reflecting that while there was only a single death as a result of the British attack in 
the Caroline incident, the potential number of fatalities posed by modern ballistics and 
weaponry is unconscionable. As things stand, using purely imminence as a connection to the 
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necessity of a defensive attack neglects to account for the consequence of the attack. By this I 
mean that the defensive action in pre-emptive attack is concerned with the threat at the 
current time only, rather than the broader implications of the futurity of the threat.  
 
On this conception of self-defence, being able to defend yourself is restricted as a measure of 
last resort. To defend oneself requires a necessity of response due to the imminence of the 
attack, and that is what makes the defensive attack justified. There is a necessary connection 
between imminence, feeling threatened and acting defensively in response to it. This 
reiterates why, in the conventional distinction, pre-emptive attacks are construed as justified 
while early military attacks are not. Pre-emptive attack is a defensive, necessary attack, 
grounded in a fear of an impending threat. On the other hand, early military attacks strike first 
and strike at a threat that is only a potentiality, and thus strike prior to a point which may be 
deemed a last resort.  
 
iii) A consequentialist conception of self-defence 
 
From here I will return to using the term ‘preventive war’, rather than ‘early military attack’, 
in order to make clear that I am ascribing to it a form of ‘moral baggage’ that Shue wished to 
avoid, that is, that it is a morally justified position of self-defence.  
 
Why then should the conception of self-defence be broadened to include preventive wars in 
light of the modern war arena? Primarily, it is because a conception that does not restricts one 
to becoming a ‘sitting-duck’ and to leave open the possibility of a worse outcome than if 
action could be taken in self-defence. Its rigid demand of a Walzerian concept of imminence 
and necessity simply overlooks the modern enemy who can appear in focus at such times 
where the attack isn’t expected immediately. This means that using the imminence rule as a 
measure for self-defence, and thus rendering preventive wars unjustifiable, disregards 
possible windows of opportunity that can prevent the potential threat becoming an actual 
threat. While this raises questions of non-military intervention as a means to act self-
defensively, the war environment we are confronted with today, particularly in light of the 
growing role of terrorism, means that sometimes non-military action cannot be contemplated. 
This is explored in detail in section three but I argue that it would be improbable to expect 
terrorists whose aim is to die a martyr, to respond positively to negotiations. Thus the morally 
significant factor in such a broadening is recognising that a potential threat today is a different 
category to a potential threat of the past. When the nature of a threat has changed so 
drastically in terms of the damage they can cause, applying the same logic to two very distinct 
threats seems impractical.  
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What we witness then is the genesis of a consequentialist approach to self-defence, and thus a 
framework which allows for a consequentialist justification for preventive war. The logic of 
the argument is such that: the consequence of inaction by N at time t results in a set of 
circumstances C. The consequence of action – preventive war - by N at the same time t results 
in a set of circumstances C1. If by virtue of a potential threat becoming an actual threat, C 
results in a bleaker set of conditions than C1, then there should be a framework in which 
taking the action of preventive war at t is incorporated into a self-defence conception. In the 
conventional Just War Theory, to satisfy the last resort condition the bellicose action would 
have to be shown to be necessary, and if it could not be shown, the last resort condition would 
be breached. As I discuss in section three however, the last resort condition as currently 
understood is not fit for purpose in the modern world of war and as such this demand can be 
bracketed for the time being.  
 
With the prospect of a consequentialist approach to self-defence, the calculus of the 
consequences should be clear. As I explain in the following paragraphs, the nature of 
consequence entails an element of uncertainty. As such, specified consequences are difficult 
to adequately foresee and thus I take a general approach to this problem. My position 
incorporates the idea that aggressive war is such a bad, that it could be deemed as the worst 
outcome. Therefore, if the foreseen war in circumstance C is predicted to be a worse war than 
C1, which would include things like a greater loss of life, a bigger environmental effect, and 
an increase in global instability, then C1 could be deemed to be a better consequence than C.  
 
If a conception of self-defence was indeed broadened to incorporate the probability and 
possible size of such an attack, the measuring of the expected harm would allow people to 
take measures to reduce these expected harms, including military action, at a time earlier than 
the ‘last resort’ conventionally dictates. The obvious problem with a consequential framework 
in not simply war, but a multitude of things, is the epistemic uncertainty surrounding 
counterfactual projections, and further, which features of the consequences should be 
accounted for. The issue of what currency the consequences should take however is not 
something that can be universally applied in the same manner for all situations. It is 
contextual. The nature of war is so intricate that the consequences will vary dramatically from 
one scenario to the next, save for the general consequence of destroying the area in which the 
war takes place, and as such there is not scope to have a general doctrine for all situations. 
What is important to note however, is this remains the case for all instances of war; it isn’t 
uniquely applicable to a preventive doctrine. Any form of war should account for the 
consequences, and indeed, the traditional conception of Just War Theory indicates as much. 
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The fourth condition, requiring a “probability of success” implies that before any justified war 
the consequences of aggressive action must be taken into account, and as such, the lacking of 
a provision of what the currency of consequences should be, does not undermine the 
preventive case for war. In each case, there should be a contextual consideration of the 
possible consequences, rather than a comparative application of these consequences against a 
broader, more general schema.  
 
Combined with intuitive discomfort at trying to reduce human life to an analysis of costs 
versus benefits, promoting the consequentialist conception of self-defence and by extension 
preventive war, seems tricky. While a significant objection, not least when attributed to a 
situation as grave as warfare, it is not an insurmountable problem. The central issue in making 
epistemically difficult modal judgements is summarised nicely by David Rodin: “[b]ecause 
consequentialist assessment requires a comparative judgement between the consequences of 
fighting and not fighting a given war, it always depends upon questions of counterfactual 
history that are intrinsically unknowable” (Rodin, 2007, 147). To make the challenge of 
providing a consequentialist justification even greater for the proponent of preventive war, it 
holds true that even after a war has ended, it remains near impossible to account for all the 
different potentialities that choosing an alternative path may have provided. Decades after the 
Vietnam War for instance, can any historian, with retrospective certainty, declare how the war 
would have concluded had Australia not been involved, or if the United States had withdrawn 
at a different time? It is this uncertainty that provides the challenge that must be answered.  
 
It is profoundly difficult to even speculate upon the different outcomes that could have arisen 
from war, and “[t]here is simply no reliable way to answer these and countless other relevant 
counterfactual questions like them” (Rodin, 2007, 147). It is important to note however that 
such problems are not unique to preventive doctrines, and are a feature of any war, including 
of a traditional Catholic nature. With epistemic difficulties in justifying preventive action 
through a consequentialist conception of self-defence, the preventive war proponent is in a 
precarious position. Holding such a position is not a lost cause however. By reducing the 
epistemic demand on the attacker who wishes to engage in preventive war, a concept of 
defensive preventive war emerges. If it is proposed that rather than having knowledge of 
certainties, a consequentialist account of self-defence requires the less demanding notion of 
probability of attack, states would be granted more flexibility in taking preventive action as 
an attack gets more probable (Yoo, 2014, 85).  
 
Although it can confuse situations, drawing analogies with elements of the doctrine of self-
defence in criminal law is helpful to demonstrate how the probability of attack functions 
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within a preventive war doctrine. It shows that there can be prudential reasons to invoke such 
a law, even when a threat is a long way off or speculative. From these examples we can arrive 
at the conclusion that temporal distance doesn’t provide sufficient reason to relinquish the 
right of self-defence.  
 
To start with, let us arrive at a conclusion that individual self-defence is justifiable with 
distant harms, and build upon this basis. Such an idea is demonstrated well by introducing 
Jeff McMahon’s hypothetical ‘Paralysis Example’, which goes roughly as follows. It comes 
to your attention that there is conclusive proof an individual has a carefully planned out 
process to kill you when you suffer from paralysis and as such cannot defend yourself. With 
inadequate policing and thus reason to suspect they won’t be able to help you, the only way to 
survive the impending paralysis and attempt on your life is to use lethal force against the 
would-be killer, despite the fact that it is not at all imminent (McMahon, 2006, 173). 
McMahon claims, with good reason, that this would be a morally justified action. Here there 
is no imminent threat, but a foreseeable threat to your life at some point in the future and as 
such morally justified preventive action can be taken. This suggests that while temporal 
imminence may be a decisive feature when formulating a theory of self-defence, it is not the 
only feature that should be considered.  
 
The above example is forward looking. It is based on knowledge that while not certain is 
highly probable due to explicit statements by the potential killers. There is scope however to 
provide a justified case of self-defence even when such intentions haven’t been stated. Take 
for example, the ‘battered woman’ prospect of self-defence, “where women who have 
suffered severe and repeated physical abuse at the hands of their spouses resort to force in 
self-defence. For such a woman, going to the police may have little effect, and past abuse 
may lead her to reasonably believe that her life is at risk” (Yoo, 2014, 86).  This example is 
independent of imminence altogether. Rather, it responds to past conduct which indicates a 
probability that there is likely to be harm in the future. It provides a justification for a use of 
defensive force that is distinct from temporal assessment, and lends itself to making 
predictions based on probability rather than strict adherence to imminence. It is for this reason 
that Allen Buchanan reflects “at least in the case of individual self-defence…it seems that 
mere temporal distance is not sufficient to cancel the right of self-defence” (Buchanan, 2007, 
126). A similar logic could be applied to states who have shown disregard for international 
laws and expressed bellicose intentions. This is not to say that these two characteristics are 
sufficient for a preventive war, but could be combined to demonstrate the sort of behaviours 
that would be the counterpart to the abusive husband in the above-mentioned case. 
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While the stated examples have focused on an individual right to self-defensive measures, 
even in cases where a likely harm is simply probably, it can be shown to incorporate state 
level collective action too. For this I draw on the Lethal Virus case proposed by Robert O. 
Keohane and Allen Buchanan, in their paper suggesting a cosmopolitan approach to 
preventive war. The case can be summarised in this way. Country A receives credible 
evidence from a plurality of different sources that there is an international terrorist 
organisation who, having already committed deadly attacks of great magnitude, multiple 
times, have come into possession of a lethal and contagious virus that it plans to release in a 
global city. Based on the knowledge they presently have, “there is no reason to believe that 
the release of the virus is imminent, but there is good reason to believe that once the virus 
leaves the terrorists’ remote mountain stronghold the chances of intercepting it are poor” 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2004, 4). Here there is recognition that while the threat is not 
necessarily imminent, there is probable cause for great concern, based on the past actions of 
the group. The solution to this threat is to strike in the mountainous region, within the borders 
of Country B, and this would destroy the virus and only kill the members of the terrorist 
group. Buchanan rightly suggests that “surely under these circumstances it would be 
justifiable to use lethal force preventively and the fact that force would be deployed 
collectively against a group, rather than against an individual…is immaterial” (Buchanan, 
2007, 127).    
 
What I have attempted to demonstrate here is that collective self-defence at state level is not 
required to be limited to acting only in response to an action that is causing harm, or about to 
cause imminent harm, but can legitimately be waged responding to temporally distant, 
probable attacks. I have drawn on this to elucidate that it would be wrong to deem preventive 
war impermissible on the grounds that it isn’t acting in self-defence. Such arguments make 
the misguided objection that since the target of such action hasn’t done anything wrong, it 
follows that their right not to be attacked has been violated. I referred to the Lethal Virus and 
Battered Woman cases to demonstrate that a harm doesn’t have to be imminent to relinquish 
such a right, but that based on previous behaviour, a conclusion of probability can be drawn 
to justify self-defence.  
 
Probable cause isn’t limited to the backward-looking cases that I discussed however. It is also 
possible to make a case that the use of defensive force is justified in response to available 
evidence, rather than referencing past activities. Such cases can be made clear by drawing 
analogies with laws of criminal conspiracy. These laws suggest that there is criminal liability 
in conspiring to commit acts, rather than the actual committing of the act. Cases invoking 
such laws are common and are a prudential application of legal requirements. They can be 
PPE MA Thesis 
Supervisor: Glen Newey  Alex Russell (s1735098) 
 
 18 
summarised indicating “…one may be liable to defensive force, and even to punishment, 
without having committed a criminal act, if one has engaged in sufficiently clear and serious 
preparations for performing such an act” (Rodin, 2007, 166).  
 
An obvious example of this is if police gather intelligence of a conspired bank heist, it does 
not need to be committed before arrests are made. Importantly, conspiring itself is a crime, 
and thus if the heist was in fact committed, the conspirers could be charged with both 
conspiring and committing the heist. In a similarly prudential way, would it not be sensible to 
recognise similar conspiring happening on a global level and intelligence suggesting its 
existence should be heeded. The aforementioned Lethal Virus case represents such a 
conspiracy. While in that case it was argued that the probability of attack was due to the 
previous behaviour and actions of the terrorist group, a similar logic can be applied in cases 
where such previous malevolence was not apparent. If the intelligence received by Country A 
was indicative of a terrorist group’s intentions to cause widespread destruction, a requirement 
that they had done it before seems overly restrictive.  
 
An important addition to this logic is that the intention is attainable of course. If 
communications are intercepted between two people regarding their intention to release sarin 
gas in the centre of a busy city, it would have to be shown that such an ambition is 
theoretically achievable. Without sufficient means to carry out such an attack, the two would-
be terrorists could be written off as fantastical. As Allen Buchanan notes, “[r]eflection on the 
law of conspiracy indicates that using force against someone who has not yet committed a 
wrongful harm need not violate his rights. The elements of conspiracy include a specific 
intention to do a wrongful harm and an agreed plan of action to produce the harm” 
(Buchanan, 2007, 135). In the case of the two fantastical terrorists, the plan of action to 
produce the harm would be unrealistic to the point that it is ungrounded. David Luban 
highlights the existence of such a condition in criminal law stating that “[t]eenagers hanging 
out at a strip mall…may while away the time with conversations that begin ‘Hey, why don’t 
we rob the Seven-Eleven?...’ without ever seriously planning to do so. The basic US 
conspiracy statute requires not only a group plan but also at least one overt action taken in 
furtherance of the plan” (Luban, 2007, 192). Likewise, justifying preventive war appealing to 
conspiracy would require similar conditions.  
 
As has been previously said, drawing comparisons between international relations and civil 
law is murky, but the utility of making such analogies should be recognised. The laws of 
conspiracy provide an explanation how someone or something can have committed a wrong 
without necessarily causing harm in that moment or imminently. For some however, making 
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this analogy does no such thing. Rather than provide grounds to recognise wrongful acts in 
spite of a lack of harm, when used as analogies for international relations, the laws of 
conspiracy simply expose a paradox. David Rodin highlights this paradox stating:  
 
“if a conspiracy to attack (consisting in a manifest intent and active preparation) is a form of 
wrongdoing sufficient to ground preventive military action, then doctrines of prevention such as the 
National Security Strategy are ipso facto morally wrong…If manifest intent and active preparation 
together constitute a wrong sufficient to ground preventive war, then any doctrine of preventive war is 
impermissible. If, on the other hand, doctrines of prevention are permissible, then the combination of 
manifest intent and active preparation are presumably not in themselves wrong” (Rodin, 2007, 167). 
 
The implication of this is therefore that the moral grounds of preventive war relative to the 
laws of conspiracy stand and fall together. Either both sides are guilty of conspiring and 
relinquish their right to not be attacked, or neither is.  
 
While this paradox is testing, it overlooks the asymmetry between a conspiracy to attack 
somewhere specific and a general policy of preventive action, such as the 2002 National 
Security Strategy that Rodin discusses. Recall from earlier the content of the strategy, which 
states “America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed”. This 
indicates a general policy that in case a threat does emerge, action will be taken. It is 
implicitly conditional and reactive. In contrast, a terrorist group or state conspiring to attack 
somewhere specifically is a plan of a different sort. It is proactive, with a particular place in 
mind, and a particular means of constructing an attack. The general policy acts as insurance 
against the more specific nature of planned attacks, and thus the two cannot be compared in 
the way Rodin would like. The reactive nature of the NSS policy is not apparent in the 
proactive conspiracy that a group may have of attacking a particular place.   
 
4) Addressing an Objection to Preventive War 
  
In recognising a defensive right to attack however, and extending it to incorporate preventive 
war, it is suggested that there is a glaring and undesirable consequence. If, as has been argued, 
claims of acting in self-defence don’t require an immediate threat, but are applicable to 
situations in which a threat is merely potential, it seems that a Hobbesian state of nature is 
upon us on a global scale, in which war of all against all is justified. Neta Crawford addresses 
this broadening of the conception of self-defence, and questions at which point one must 
accept an action as aggression rather than defensive action: “If fear justifies assault, then the 
occasions for attack will potentially be limitless…we cannot always know what the other side 
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has, where it might be located, or when it might be used.” (Crawford, 2003, 33). The worry 
here for Crawford is that having a doctrine of preventive war becomes “self-defeating as it 
increases instability and insecurity” (Crawford, 2003, 35).  
 
The implication is that under the conception of self-defence to which I have argued, any 
military strike at any time is justified, because every other military unit is a potential threat by 
virtue of being a separate competing state to oneself. The reason every other state can be 
interpreted as a potential threat for advocates of this position is the epistemic difficulty in 
being certain of another state or group’s intentions. Uncertainty means insecurity. There are 
two important points to make in light of this; the first being a response to the problem 
Crawford presents. In any setting, absolute knowledge of circumstances is a rare privilege, 
especially so in international relations; knowledge, as they say, is power. Granting this, it 
should be agreed that almost any decision made at an international level is made with a 
certain element of judgement on the probability of events transpiring in a particular way.  
 
As I argued previously, in a consequentialist conception of self-defence, through which an 
account of justified preventive war emerges, a decision to engage in war is complex and 
based on probability of certain consequences. There would be a plurality of contesting factors 
which a decision to launch a preventive war would incorporate, and what’s more, institutional 
demands are a possible governor of this. For example, Buchanan and Keohane propose the 
idea of a system of accountability to accompany justified preventive wars since “no single 
state can be counted upon fully to take into proper account the interests of others, particularly 
when considering the use of military force. Therefore, processes by which states…can hold 
states accountable are essential if the parochial concerns of the most powerful are not to be 
allowed to prevail over broader interests and shared values” (Buchanan & Keohane, 2004, 
11). They suggest a system of accountability entailing two components; standards and the 
sharing of information. This would entail consultation with the international community prior 
to using force, and the sharing of information must be “comprehensive enough for other states 
to make independent judgements on the costs and benefits of the preventive use of force” 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2004, 13). Such a system of accountability and sharing would serve 
to maintain general order amongst the international community.  
 
This of course is based on the assumption that there would be general concordance amongst 
the international community with regards to adhering to such standards. It certainly isn’t a 
given, but prudential reasons suggest to me that such a system could prevent the Hobbesian 
worldview that Crawford fears. It would be unwise for a state to disregard such institutional 
norms for two reasons. First, it would be a quick and effective way to isolate oneself from the 
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international community. The less adherence one state shows to agreed principles, the more 
damage it will do to its reputation and thus acting in a reckless manner would be inimical to 
the state’s standing in the global order. Moreover, consistent disregard of such accountability 
would make that state itself, justifiably, a pariah state and prone to collective attacks itself 
from an alliance of the abiding states. It then seems prudential for individual states to adhere 
to the general principals that a system of accountability would require. As such, a doctrine of 
prevention agreed at an institutional level, could in fact serve to increase global security, 
resulting in a situation quite the contrary to Crawford’s supposition.  The prospect of a 
situation of a high level of warfare is in fact the barrier to such a state of affairs.  
 
The second important point to make with reference to Crawford’s fear of a war of all against 
all is that its logic exposes the fundamental problem with the last resort condition in today’s 
state of affairs. Recall the components of the condition elaborated on at the beginning of this 
paper. It mandates that if anything else can be done other than initiating war, then these 
should be exhausted prior to such an initiation. Such methods could involve sanctions and 
diplomacy for example. If we examine this demand against the modern war environment that 
I have presented throughout this paper, the last resort condition begins to look precarious.  
Crawford argues that “…we cannot always know what the other side has, where it might be 
located, or when it might be used” (Crawford, 2003, 33), and because of this, in a world with 
an accepted doctrine of preventive war, total warfare would be a possible scenario because 
everyone could be a potential threat. In light of this, how does the epistemic demand of the 
last resort condition differ for cases of pre-emptive attack and preventive war, in a modern 
environment with terrorist organisations and weapons of mass destruction?   
 
In the traditional sense of war where modern technologies and global terrorism were not 
accounted for, the last resort condition is one of the ways of understanding the distinction 
between pre-emptive attack and preventive war. This is demonstrated in showing that 
preventive war, historically, has not been a last resort whilst pre-emptive attacks are, or are at 
least considerably closer to what would be considered, a last resort. Today however, the 
development of WMD’s and global terrorism has collapsed that distinction from an 
epistemological perspective.  
 
This collapse can be shown with reference to a separate paper in which Crawford argued that 
“legitimate pre-emption could occur if four necessary conditions, rooted in the just war 
tradition were met” (Crawford, 2007, 119). These four conditions require first that a pre-
emptive attack is truly in self-defence. Secondly it must be a reaction to a credible fear and 
imminent in the sense that it is made manifest within weeks, and that if one waited there 
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would be no military option to eliminate it. Thirdly it is justified if it would succeed in 
reducing the threat, and fourthly that it’s only achievable through military action. It appears to 
me that the two positions Crawford displays here are incongruent. If we bracket the self-
defence requirement (since this has been extensively discussed already), and focus on the 
remaining three conditions, the problems Crawford addresses in the construction behind the 
argument that preventive doctrines could lead to continuous warzone, should apply to her 
doctrine of pre-emption too. I am not arguing that the consequences of the two doctrines are 
the same, but that the structural issue of epistemic uncertainty remains present in both, if 
Crawford’s pre-emptive doctrine is understood in today’s war environment. In short, I 
contend that the background of epistemic uncertainty Crawford argues is a damaging feature 
of the preventive doctrine persists in her pre-emptive requirements, when considered in a 
modern light. 
 
The first way to demonstrate this is to question how, in the modern day, one can know when 
they have arrived at the last resort. Crawford’s fourth condition of pre-emptive attack being 
justified in cases where military action is the only option is another way of saying what the 
last resort condition is trying to make clear, but Cecil Coady recognised the difficulties in 
judging this: “…[t]he idea of last resort has its problems, since…there are epistemological 
puzzles about how we can know whether we have exhausted the list of effective alternatives 
to the use of violence” (Coady, 2005, 145). Historically, when troops start gathering on the 
border of a state, coupled with other factors such as bellicose rhetoric, it could be 
acknowledged that some sort of last resort was approaching. In contrast, when long-range 
weapons can strike with speed and caprice, the last resort can confront you without other 
resorts even being considered, and what’s more, the logic of last resort seems incompatible 
when applied to terrorist groups whose only currency is violence. If groups of people are 
committed to dying for a cause, as has been evident with suicidal terrorist attacks over recent 
years, there seems to be no room for negotiation. By their own volition, death is the only 
outcome for the terrorist, and as such, constructive deliberation over the various alternative 
options that could be levied at them seems futile.  
 
Furthermore, her third condition requiring successful reduction of the threat is prone to 
similar counterfactual objections that Rodin levies against a preventive argument for self-
defence illustrated in section 2.iii. It is speculative, and while it is not problematic to make 
these assertions in constructing a framework of just war, the same uncertainty that applies to a 
preventive doctrine that Crawford argues against is used in her defence of the pre-emptive 
doctrine. In light of the inadequacies of evaluating an attack, even retrospectively as outlined 
in section 2, presumably for Crawford such judgement would involve an element of justified 
PPE MA Thesis 
Supervisor: Glen Newey  Alex Russell (s1735098) 
 
 23 
probability rather than just a subjective belief on the part of the attacker, as the former is the 
less radical position to hold and less partisan. As such, justified probability would involve an 
element of consensus rather than just an agent’s subjective belief. 
 
Naturally this raises questions regarding the ethics of belief, and such questions go beyond 
the scope of this paper, but theoretically a set of standards could be made to be reasonably 
robust in light of good reason-based evidence, in the way that Buchanan and Keohane argued 
for by means of institutional accountability. In the same way, this could be applied as an 
objection to Crawford’s criticism of a doctrine of prevention. Such a doctrine could rely on 
justified probability for preventive action in the same way that Crawford would presumably 
advocate for fulfilling her third criterion of pre-emption, and if this is the case, there is no 
reason to suppose that preventive war doctrines lead to a Hobbesian state of affairs.  
 
Tied into this is on what basis would Crawford consider a judgement to be made about the 
probable success of a military attack. If it is on intelligence of the enemy’s weaponry and 
arsenal, then it remains to be seen how one can be sure they have the required amount of 
detail needed to make such a decision. The second condition requires that a threat be manifest 
and imminent within weeks, but what if there is a real threat kept secret? The epistemic 
demands of Crawford’s four conditions, when considered in the international environment 
today, are analogous to those which would be required in a preventive doctrine, and as such 
the epistemological distinction that is present in the conventional approach to war collapses 
when confronted with the modern paradigm of war. It is thus my claim that if last resort can 
be used as justification for pre-emptive war in the conventional application of the just war 
theory, then in a theory that is brought into the 21st century, such a justification extends to the 
concept of preventive war too. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this essay I have tried to demonstrate that because the nature of war is a changing 
process, the moral principles guiding the decision to call a war “just” must change too, in 
order to remain relevant and applicable. In recognising that advanced weapons are at a point 
in which a strike can be launched quickly, precisely, and with little prior warning, it indicated 
that a last resort condition no longer had the scope to accomplish its original aim, that is, 
deducing that a point in time is a last resort and that alternative means of de-escalation cannot 
always be applied. Moreover, the increasing role that non-state actors play in bellicose actions 
have rendered the last resort condition incongruent with the concept of martyrdom. The last 
resort is the sole resort in dealing with groups defined by violence.  
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What’s more, such is the changing nature of war that it challenges the conventional 
distinctions that can be seen as a just cause for war. The dichotomy of pre-emptive attacks 
and preventive war, which has been argued is apparent in war theory literature, breaks down 
when considered through the spectrum of the modern war environment. That a case can be 
made for preventive war to be incorporated under a consequentialist conception of self-
defence, and that self-defensive actions are generally regarded as a just cause for war, 
demonstrates this, and the traditional distinction regarding pre-emptive strikes as permissible 
and preventive war as impermissible appears to come together as the epistemic structure of 
the two doctrines become increasingly similar. As such, there seems to be a case that in some 
circumstances a preventive war doctrine should be regarded as permissible.  
 
Of course, there are limitations to the argument. I don’t offer specific suggestions to serve as 
a legal basis in international law, but hope to make manifest the restrictive nature that the just 
war theory currently contains, and why it should be reconsidered. Furthermore, there is no 
investigation into whether there should be a difference in application of a preventive war 
doctrine in cases of what would be considered conventional war between two states, and the 
contrasting issue of a war against non-state actors. Neither of these detract however from the 
overall conception of preventive war, which I have attempted to argue is justifiable in certain 
situations.  
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